The literature argues that income growth leads to increased demand for environmental quality and thus reduction in pollution. Using a utility theoretic model, we hypothesize that the income±pollution relationship should depend on the level of disamenity of the pollutant. We proxy for disamenity using the toxicity of releases. For counties in the United States, the functional relationship between income and releases depends on the level of disamenity: the form is more concave for more toxic releases. We find that environmental improvements occur at lower levels of per capita income for more toxic pollutants. (JEL Q25, Q28, O13)
I. INTRODUCTION
A body of literature now exists that suggests that geographic and geopolitical variation in pollution may be explained in part by variation in income. Summary articles of the key contributions to the literature include Esty (2001) and Cavlovic et al. (2000) . A noted result in this literature is the presence of a quadratic relationship between per capita income and pollution releases (an effect frequently referred to as the environmental Kuznets curve, or EKC). That is, at low income levels increases in income lead to increases in pollution, but at some point (known as the income turning point, ITP) further increases in income will result in decreasing pollution levels. Although the empirical results in this literature are compelling, the authors largely fail to offer a utility theoretic justification for why income growth might be linked to pollution abatement.
We develop a simple utility theoretic model to link consumer disutility with toxic releases. We build on a model introduced by Antweiler et al. (2001) . Antweiler et al. use their model to help explain the effects of trade on pollution releases across countries. Their model is the first attempt to develop a utility theoretic model of income and environmental quality. We use the basic foundations of this model to explain specifically how consumer preferences for environmental quality will lead to a quadratic relationship between per capita income and pollution releases. Unlike Antweiler and colleagues, we use our model to develop and test hypotheses regarding mechanisms that might link consumer preferences more directly with environmental disamenityandthuspollutionlevels.Ourversionof the Antweiler et al. model predicts that the level of disamenity caused by a pollutant should directly impact the income±pollution relationship. Although some articles have addressed the heterogeneous impacts of different pollutants, for example, Mendelsohn (1986) , a serious attempt to model the affects of heterogeneity in environmental disamenity and emissions is absent from the literature. Our model also indicates that the degree to which preferences can be expressed by consumers and brought to bear on industry should have important effects on the total amount of toxic pollutants released within an area. Following Arora and Cason (1999) , Brooks and Sethi (1997) , and Hamilton (1993) , we use measures of voter participation and socioeconomic characteristics to proxy for the activism of consumers and the representation of consumers by government. By controlling for the effects of income and representation, we better isolate the remaining effects of ethnicity on toxic releases.
We use a reduced form of our model to better specify an empirical model of toxic releases that includes economic factors, characteristics of consumers, and characteristics of the pollutantÐespecially toxicityÐas explanatory variables. By focusing on disamenity effects and treating toxicity as an explanatory variable in our model, we find ITPs that begin at $25,338 for the least toxic pollutants and decline to $21,066 for the most toxic releases. (Antweiler et al. examine only sulfur dioxide in their study.) We also find expected coefficients on community characteristics and economic factors, including a proxy for the capital intensity of manufacturing in an area.
A brief discussion of key studies in the literature will help illuminate the present study. Early work by Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) finds that for certain types of pollutants, there exists a quadratic relationship between per capita income and pollution levels; at low levels, rising income should lead to increases in pollution, but eventually the relationship will switch to one in which increases in income lead to reductions in pollution levels. The point at which this transition occurs is known as the ITP. Using a multicountry panel on macroeconomic indicators (Penn World Tables Mark V) and pollution data from the Global Environment Monitoring System, the authors estimate income±pollution curves that exhibit varying shapes over different types of pollution. For example, among air pollutants tested the authors find an inverted-U-shaped relationship for smoke in cities and to a lesser degree for sulfur dioxide, whereas the relationship between income and heavy particles is monotonically declining. Using similar data, Seldon and Song (1994) find inverted-U-shaped relationships between income and CO, SO 2 , suspended particulate matter, and NO x with each pollutant exhibiting varying degrees of concavity (and increasingly higher ITPs). One implication of these findings is that per capita income growth could lead to lower levels of pollution; however, the sensitivity of the income±pollution relationship varies across pollutants. Although Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) and Seldon and Song (1994) report the income±pollution relationship for individual pollutants and note the differences across their samples, no attempt is made at explaining the source of these differences.
Other authors find empirical evidence for the EKC even within a single country. Arora and Cason (1999) use Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and census data from the United States to explore the empirical relationship for a single year between toxic releases, income, and community characteristics. Unlike Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) and Selden and Song (1994) , Arora and Cason (1999) estimate a model that has as its dependent variable the aggregate total releases (in pounds) of all examined pollutants. Depending on the specification of the model and the sample, the authors find significant variance in their income turning point estimates for aggregated releases starting with an income turning point of approximately $30,000 (median per capita income). The authors also find, however, that coefficients on many community characteristics run counter to economic intuition and the literature on environmental justice. For example, the authors find that nonwhite populations are associated with lower levels of pollution. For additional discussion of environmental justice issues see Asch and Seneca (1978) and Brajer and Hall (1992) . Brooks and Sethi (1997) more fully specify the dependent``environmental degradation'' variable in their reduced-form empirical model by using a combined index of toxicity and pounds of releases. Using a four-year panel of zip code±level data on toxic releases in the United States, Brooks and Sethi (1997) find that their reduced form also reveals an EKC for income and their toxicity index with the expected signs for coefficients on community characteristics. Surprisingly, however, Brooks and Sethi estimate income turning points of $67,000 and $143,000, figures that the authors note appear to be implausibly high.
Although the EKC is often interpreted to mean that environmental quality will improve with increasing levels of income, these previous studies demonstrate that the relationship between pollution and income varies tremendously across pollutants. Without an explicit model relating income and pollution levels, Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) are unable to provide a utility theoretic explanation for why the EKC relationship could be found only for a subset of the pollutants examined. Arora and Cason (1999) and Brooks and Sethi (1997) also fail to provide a utility theoretic foundation for their empirical models.
Unlike earlier studies, we provide a systematic analysis of the role of pollutant differences in determining the relationship between income and pollution releases. The standard applications of the EKC assume that society responds to pollution to reduce environmental harm; a corollary is that at least some part of society can assess the harm caused by pollutants and has the means to regulate such pollution. As such, an EKC relationship between pollutants and income should be stronger with more obvious and damaging environmental harms. We develop a model and provide empirical evidence that links the noxiousness of pollutants, the degree of exposure of the population to pollutants, and the physical form of pollutants to the relationship between pollutants and income. We show that indeed the characteristics of the pollutant are as important as the characteristics of the responding economy in determining the ultimate relationship between income growth and environmental quality.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First we present our theoretical framework and outline the hypotheses we intend to explore. Then we describe our data and results. The results are organized into three areas: biochemical characteristics as determinants of releases, technological constraints, and standard control variables from the literature. Finally, we summarize our results and present concluding remarks.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS CONSTRUCTION
Producers, Consumers, and Government et al. (2001) develop a theoretical model demonstrating the relationship between pollution levels and socioeconomic characteristics across countries. Antweiler et al. illustrate a release level determination mechanism through which pollution levels are determined. Three types of agents comprise the mechanismÐproducers, consumers, and the government. In this article, we adopt and extend their model to motivate our hypotheses and empirical analyses.
Antweiler
The production side of the economy consists of a large number of firms producing a variety of consumption goods and services. We assume that each firm's production is characterized by constant returns to scale and they participate in a competitive market environment. Chemical releases are expelled as a by-product of the production process, rel Bq, abate 1 where rel [rel 1 , F F F , rel m ] is a vector of release levels for m chemicals, q is a measure of industrial output, and abate captures investment in pollution abatement technology. All firms have the opportunity to invest in abatement technology that will reduce their releases. For simplicity, we assume that the efficacy of abatement technology is known with certainty. Ultimately, the total level of abatement depends on the cost of abatement relative to the pollution tax. Generally, the firm will only abate up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the pollution tax. Of course, abatement costs (and technologies) vary among firms and across pollutants. As a result, we expect there to be some heterogeneity in the actual level of abatement chosen by individual firms.
The firms choose their output and abatement levels to maximize profits taking prices, abatement costs, and pollution taxes as given. The profit function of an individual firm is given by,
where p represents a vector of input and output prices, q is the level of output of the consumption good, abate is a vector of abatement spending levels undertaken by the firm to reduce releases, and reg i is a vector of costly pollution regulation (e.g. a``command and control'' regulation or a tax) on chemical i. Investment in abatement technology for chemical i increases with reg i , ceteris paribus. In the short-run, abatement is costly (i.e., p abate`0 ). Consumers in our model maximize their utility conditional on the level of environmental disamenity present. Every consumer has well-behaved preferences, and their utility is a function of consumption and environmental disamenity. Generally, the aggregate consumer's utility function is given by
where c is a vector of consumption levels of goods and services, z i is the environmental disamenity from chemical i, m is the number of chemicals released into the environment, E is all other aspects of environmental quality, Y is income, p is a vector of prices of consumption goods, and all income is spent on consumption, c. The utility function follows standard assumptions: u is concave in consumption (u c b0, u cc`0 ) and increasing in environmental quality (u E b0, u EE`0 ; u z`0 , u zz b0). Consumption is a function of income and prices. On average, the consumer's income depends on the income of the local firm (e.g., through direct employment, stockholding, or tax transfers). Without further loss of generality we assume that the consumer's income depends directly on the profitability of the local firm, YP/N where N is the population. Because utility is concave in c, we know that the marginal utility of consumption declines as income levels increase. Following Weitzman (1994) , we assume that the marginal utility of environmental quality (a public good) is nondeclining with increasing income. With declining marginal utility of consumption and nondeclining marginal utility of environmental quality, the importance of environmental effects relative to consumption (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution) grows with the increasing scale of economic activity. Note that this effect is sufficient for a static (cross-sectional) inverted-U-shaped relationship between income and environmental quality.
1 If, as Weitzman hypothesizes, the marginal utility of environmental quality is increasing with income, then this effect is further reinforced. In either case the consumer's preferred mix of consumption and environmental quality changes with increasing levels of income. As income grows, consumers prefer increases in environmental quality relative to increased quantities of consumption goods. (Note that at higher income levels, consumers may also begin to demand goods, c, produced with cleaner technologies. For simplicity, we do not model the demand for green products here but note that the results of such demand reinforce our model.)
We assume that the level of disamenity corresponds with the health and environmental impacts of the pollutant. The level of environmental disamenity is a function of release levels or emissions, the harm caused by these releases (which is itself a function of exposure), and the obviousness of the pollution.
2 We assume specifically that the level of disamenity associated with chemical i is given by the function
where rel i denotes the level of releases of chemical i, tox i is the toxicity of chemical i, and ex i is the exposure suffered by consumers from rel i . The level of chemical releases and their toxicity as well as the degree of population exposure to these chemicals all influence the aggregate harm caused by a pollutant. The level of environmental disamenity therefore is an increasing function of rel i , tox i , and ex i .
In our model, the government responds (to varying degrees) to the preferences of both consumers and firms as in Peltzman (1976) . The degree to which the government responds to the demand by consumers for better environmental quality depends on the level of political activism and representation of consumers. As the consumers' preferred mix of consumption and environmental quality changes, so does the government's willingness to regulate polluters. As income increases, the government responds to consumer demand for a cleaner environment by imposing more stringent regulations on the polluting firms (either through command and control or market-based mechanisms). Specifically, the stringency of regulation reflects the income and thus consumption of consumers and the disamenity caused by the pollutants 3 1. Of course, eventually income should be spent on the provision of environmental quality up to the point where the marginal utility of both environmental quality and consumption are equal.
2. Note that we use release levels as opposed to ambient concentrations. Release levels provide a more direct measure of firm behavior than do ambient concentration levels.
3. Without changing the model, we may assume that consumers are directly aware of the disamenities posed by emitted by the local industry
where reg [reg 1 , F F F , reg m ] is a vector of m regulations (or tax rates), rep is a measure of consumer representation or activism, and G z i 40 for all i. Thus, reg increase with releases, toxicity, the level of exposure, and political representation.
The Release Level Determination Mechanism and Hypotheses
Given the consumers' demand for consumption goods and environmental quality, the government mandates pollution regulation to maximize social welfare. Firms make their output and abatement decisions based on the demand for final goods, the cost of abatement, and the pollution regulations (or taxes) set by the government. Chemical characteristics, consumer preferences, government legislation, and firm choices jointly determine release levels of each chemical. The reduced form function for releases is
where all variables are as previously defined and x is a vector of control variables including the physical forms of the toxics released and proxies for consumer tastes and firm characteristics. For example, college graduates may be more knowledgeable or concerned about environmental quality. In our model such characteristics would be manifested as greater awareness of the true z i or greater sensitivity to environmental disamenity and would result in higher levels of consumer activism. As a result, geographic areas with relatively larger concentrations of college graduates would be expected to experience lower releases, all else equal.
The relationship between release levels and income can be derived from the model and has been demonstrated in detail in Antweiler et al. (2001) . At low income levels, the increasing scale of production (sometimes known as the scale effect) dominates the effect of increasing demand for environmental quality. When incomes are low, consumers are mainly concerned with acquiring larger quantities of consumption goods. At low income levels, the marginal utility of additional consumption is likely to be higher than the marginal utility of improved environmental quality, and thus the relative demand for environmental quality will be low. As incomes and consumption rise, the marginal utility of consumption falls while the marginal utility of environmental quality remains constant or increases. As a result, environmental quality becomes increasingly important to consumers. The demand for environmental quality grows with income and at some point dominates the scale effect, lowering release levels with further increases in income. 4 Lower levels of pollution are achieved by reducing the output of emissions per unit of industrial activity (the technique effect) or by changing the composition of local industry from more polluting firms (e.g., manufacturing) to less polluting firms (e.g., the service sector). This latter transition is known as the composition effect.
In addition to the now standard hypothesis of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between income and pollution levels, we make four other specific hypotheses regarding pollution releases. Our hypotheses result directly from the release level determination mechanism. We test the following hypotheses 5 : Hypothesis 1: Greater toxicity increases the level of disamenity and thus the EKC is more concave for more toxic chemicals (rel Y,tox b 0, rel 2 Y Ytox 50). Hypothesis 2: Cancer-causing chemicals have a higher disamenity and thus result in lower emission levels (rel cancer`0 ).
Hypothesis 3: Releases that result in greater consumer exposure to harm result in greater disamenity and thus should result in lower toxic releases (rel ex`0 ). pollutants or that the government possesses more information about pollutant disamenity than consumers but acts in the best interest of the consumer.
4. This inverse-U-shaped relationship between pollution and income is demonstrated empirically in a number of studies, including Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) , Seldon and Song (1994) , Brooks and Sethi (1997) , and Arora and Cason (1999) . A body of literature also demonstrates theoretical arguments for a quadratic relationship between pollution and income (see Harbaugh et al. [2002] ). Following this literature, we adopt a quadratic specification for our estimation. In doing so, however, we note that recent work by Harbaugh et al. (2002) questions the true nature of the pollution±income relationship and suggests that the relationship is unclear.
5. Technically, we attempt to reject the null hypotheses. We give the alternative hypotheses here for clarity.
Hypothesis 4: Consumers with greater political representation will have their preferences better represented by regulators, and thus release levels will be lower in these localities (rel rep`0 ).
Technological Constraints
The production functions of producers also influence release levels. One measure that we use to control for production differences is the capital to labor ratio (kl ). Capital-intensive industries are generally more polluting than labor-intensive industries, as discussed in Antweiler et al. (2001) and Dean (1992) . Thus areas with higher capital to labor ratios are likely to have a greater concentration of pollution-intensive industries (this can be considered the starting point for the composition effect). One would expect that counties that had higher capital to labor ratios in the early years of the TRI reporting would have higher levels of pollution, all things being equal. Because these types of industries are inherently more polluting than other industries, we hypothesize that areas with more capitalintensive industries experience higher levels of releases. In the short run (e.g., in the ten years between the first release of the TRI and 1996) , it would be difficult to alter the capitalintensity of industry within a county. Of course, over time, regulators should be able to influence the capital to labor ratios of local industry through regulation and incentives.
Control Variables
Following the literature, we include unemployment and education as control variables. At the margin, unemployed consumers are less concerned with environmental quality than with gaining employment (i.e., the marginal utility of income is greater than the marginal utility of environmental quality). Areas experiencing high rates of unemployment may be more likely to allow large releases to encourage firms to locate or continue to operate there, ceteris paribus. Education should also be important in determining toxic releases. For environmental disamenities to affect consumer utility, consumers must be aware of the effects of emissions. Individuals with more education are more likely to be cognizant of environmental disamenities.
We also control for several county-level characteristics, including population density, population location (urban versus suburban or rural), and level of manufacturing influence. Releases in more densely populated areas are likely to lead to greater levels of exposure, ceteris paribus. Urban areas tend to be more industrialized and industrialization is positively correlated with pollution. Manufacturing industries are some of the most polluting industries.
Finally, we also control for the physical form of the pollutant. The physical form of a pollutant may contribute to its obviousness to the consumer. Physical form also could be important in determining the ease of cleanup and control by emitting firms. Solid and liquid forms of pollutants can be more easily captured and contained (e.g., in barrels), whereas gaseous emissions are impossible to capture once released.
III. DATA

Toxic Release Data
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act requires all facilities in SIC codes 20±39 with ten or more full-time employees and manufacturing or processing more than 25,000 pounds or using more than 10,000 pounds of any of the designated chemicals to file annual reports with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA compiles firm reports into the TRI database. Reports contain detailed information on plantlevel releases of toxins (in pounds) into the air, land, and water. The reports also contain data on transfers of chemicals off-site and information on the plants from which the chemicals are released. Currently available data consist of ten years of release estimates for 1987±96 and are provided by the U.S. EPA (1999).
Following Brooks and Sethi (1997) , we use a simple transformation of the pounds of air releases for each of 21 chemicals in each U.S. county as our dependent variable, taking the natural log of (1 total releases of chemical i in county k). This log-linear transformation is less sensitive to large outliers than the untransformed data. The log-linear transformation also allows us to include the counties that experience zero releases of a particular chemical (whereas a natural log transformation of releases would not). Furthermore, the difference between taking the log of releases and the log of one plus releases is negligible for large levels of releases. We use all ten years of the TRI air releases.
Recognizing that the level of total releases is only a partial measure of the risk suffered by citizens, the EPA developed a toxicity ranking system. The TRI Relative Risk-Based Chronic Human Health Indicator (Indicator) was developed using a methodology similar to that used in the EPA's Hazard Ranking System as detailed by the U.S. EPA (2000b). The Hazard Ranking System scoring rates the inherent toxicity of chemicals based on measures of their cancer slope factors, reference doses, and acute toxicity levels. These individual measures are compiled and compared to produce a proportional weighting system. This system is considered superior to a simple ordinal ranking because it allows for comparison of chemicals by their toxicity weights (tw). The chemicals in our study cover the entire range of chemical toxicities (from the lowest toxicity of 0 to the highest toxicity of 1,000,000 as defined by the EPA). Due to the large range of toxicities in our estimation of releases, we use ln(1 tw) as our explanatory variable. Table 1 presents the chemicals we examine, their toxicity weights, and mean release levels (and standard deviations). We analyze the releases of 21 of the current list of over 650 chemicals. The chemicals chosen for inclusion in our study are chemicals for which reporting was required for the entire period of our study (1987±96), a requirement met by 300 chemicals. Further restricting our selection of chemicals was the availability of toxicity data. The EPA has published toxicity weights for just over 100 chemicals on the TRI list. From these 100 remaining chemicals, we selected chemicals that were in relatively greater use over the ten-year study for the 50 states (as measured by the number of air release observations in the TRI data).
We also use chemical characteristics that expand on those used in previous TRI studies. This includes whether the chemical is a known carcinogen, K, or``reasonably accepted to be a carcinogen,'' R, and physical properties of the chemicals. 6 The chemicals in our study take on one of four physical formsÐcrystals/fibers, gas, liquid, or solid/metal. We create dummy variables for the fiber, liquid, and metal forms (a dummy for chemicals taking a gaseous form has been excluded). We proxy for exposure by interacting population density with ln(1 tw).
Controlling for abatement, monitoring, and regulation costs across chemicals is also desirable. Such cost data, however, is difficult to obtain, partly because costs vary across pollutants, industries, and firms. This variation is due to technical, environmental, and other spatially determined differences (e.g., differing costs of production inputs). As a result, in our estimation we allow both abatement and regulation costs to vary independently of our explanatory variables. Failure to account for variation in these costs does not bias the coefficient estimates that we use to test our model.
Socioeconomic Data
Our socioeconomic data for each of the 3141 U.S. counties are drawn from two main sources: the Bureau of the Census, and the Regional Economic Information System. 7 Table 2 contains a list of the socioeconomic variables we use in our analysis (and their summary statistics). We note several potential shortcomings of our demographic data. First, a number of the variables in Table 2 are measured only during census years. In spite of this data constraint, we assume, as do Brooks and Sethi (1997) , that these measures did not change significantly over the period of our study and create no bias in our results. Following Brooks and Sethi (1997) and Hamilton (1993) we assume that voter participation (percentage of eligible voters actually voting, vote, and the percentage of voters that voted democrat, democrat) is a proxy for consumer activism in the regulatory process. Like some of our other variables, our measures of voter turnout also are limited in their measurement frequency. The variables vote and democrat are measured only periodically; both reflect measures of voting trends in national presidential elections. We assign the Finally, capital to labor ratios are not available by county. We use new manufacturing capital expenditures as a proxy of capital stock and the manufacturing labor force as a measure of labor. One problem with our proxy is that expenditures measure a flow, not a stock. In using our expenditure measure, we assume that the flow measure is a good indicator of the relative stock differences. In addition, we are only able to generate measures for kl in 1987. We have kl ratios for 70% of U.S. counties. Filling missing values with the mean from other counties is not appropriate because the nonreporting counties are not a random sample. (Reporting counties have significantly higher mean income, percent of earning from manufacturing, proportion college-educated population, population density, and are considerably more urban.) Excluding nonreporting counties is equally problematic. Thus, we first report our results for the smaller sample with kl, and then report our results on the complete set of counties excluding kl as an explanatory variable.
IV. RESULTS
We test the null hypothesis that toxicity levels do not influence the income±pollution relationship. Because of variation in errors across firms and pollutants, we estimate our model using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) correcting for panel heteroscedasticity. Note that the FGLS panel estimation is a random effects model. We use this estimator instead of fixed effects estimation because (1) we possibly have an incomplete census of firms, (2) the standard errors of the coefficient 6. These data are provided by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001) and by the U.S. EPA (2000a).
7. U.S. Department of Commerce (1994; 1998a; 1998b) . 8. We create two variables each for white and female: one containing the true values and zeros for missing values, the other containing 1990 values if the true value is missing and zero otherwise. Estimation of our model with these four variables yields significant negative coefficients on each of these variables. Although the estimated variance is slightly larger for the filled values (possibly indicating greater measurement error), the general result supports the use of the 1990 values where the true value is missing. estimates are more conservative under the assumption of random effects, and (3) we believe that the heteroscedasticity effects are important (and are best handled using an FGLS estimation approach). Our estimation results are presented in Table 3 . Table 3 displays results for the estimation of the model of county-level toxic releases. Consistent with the literature, we find the inverted-U-shaped relationship between releases and income. The coefficient on the interaction between income and toxicity tests Hypothesis 1. The estimated coefficient on income interacted with ln(1 tw) is positive and significant and the coefficient on income squared interacted with ln(1 tw) is negative and significant.
Biochemical Characteristics
As chemical toxicity increases, the quadratic relationship between income and release levels becomes more concave. This relationship is predicted, but not tested, by Antweiler et al. (2001) . This outcome is illustrated in Table 4 by the ITP, the income level at which pollution starts to fall with increases in income, for various toxicity levels. As toxicity rises, the ITPs occur at lower income levels (Hypothesis 1). Note that the ITP we calculate for high toxicity pollutants is similar to that found by Arora and Cason (1999) who, depending on the specification of their model, estimate ITPs starting at approximately $30,000. The mean per capita income of counties in our sample is $17,619, indicating that the average county is in a situation in which increasing income leads to increasing levels of pollution. Further note that Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) and (1984, 1988, 1992) (1984, 1988, 1992) We also find support for our other hypotheses. Releases are lower when chemicals are known to be or are potentially carcinogenic (Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on cancer is negative and significant). Releases that are likely to cause greater exposure are not found to result in significantly lower levels of releases, although the coefficient is negative as predicted by Hypothesis 3. Further, although the coefficient on our exposure measure in not significant, the coefficient on population density is significant and negative. We interpret these combined results to mean that as the population density increases (and thus the threat of exposure increases), releases decrease, but we find no differential effect of toxicity on exposure.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that increased political participation should reduce the levels of toxic releases within a locality. We find that the greater the voter participation, the lower the levels of toxic releases. We also find a positive relationship between large Democratic 
Technological Constraints
We estimate a positive, significant coefficient for the capital to labor ratio, indicating that higher ratios of capital to labor are associated with higher release levels. This result is consistent with results from international studies and theoretical models that use capital to labor ratios as a proxy for the composition effect. Our significant result underscores the importance of including a measure of capital to labor in models of toxic releases.
As explained in the data section, our capital to labor ratio data is incomplete. To account for the effect of the exclusion of 30% of U.S. counties from our analysis, we run a separate regression to estimate the model on the full set of counties without the capital to labor ratio data. The results are reported in the last column of Table 3 . The significance of only one of the estimated coefficients is affected by the exclusion of klÐthe coefficient on vote is no longer significant.
Control Variables
We control for the effects of a number of socioeconomic variables in our analysis. These explanatory variables coincide with many used in the literature and allow us to control for differences across 3141 U.S. counties. Generally we find the same sign on our coefficients as did Brooks and Sethi (1997) . Though Arora and Cason (1999) failed to find a significant effect of increased unemployment, we find that as unemployment rates increase, so do releases. We find that emissions are higher in populations with larger proportions of young people, nonwhites, and people living at or below the poverty line (groups that may be underrepresented in the political process). We also find that chemicals in gaseous form have higher release levels than those other forms.
Temporal Effects: Estimates are Robust but Changing over Time
Concerns exist in the literature over estimating TRI releases across time. First, measurement error in the TRI data is likely to vary over time. Furthermore, it is unlikely that preferences for environmental quality, and thus the coefficients on income and toxicity in our model, remain constant across time. We test for changes in our coefficients across time by running individual estimations for each year. (The results are available from the authors.) We consistently find the EKC, greater concavity for more toxic chemicals, and lower releases of carcinogens. Although the sign and significance of the coefficients on income, income squared, and income interacted with our release measure, ln(1 [tw]), do not change over time, their magnitude does vary. Furthermore, coefficients on our control variables are largely unchanged in sign and significance with the exception of our education and land area controls that are frequently insignificant.
V. CONCLUSION
The results that we present in this article support the hypothesis that toxicity levels play an important role in explaining the variation in levels of industrial chemical releases across counties in the United States. Not only do chemical characteristics have a significant effect on the level of observed releases, but the toxicity of the release also affects the way in which income growth may impact pollution levels. Most significantly, we find that the EKC is more concave for more toxic releases. The results imply that the transmission mechanism from consumers (who experience disutility from releases) to governments (who set regulation) to firms (who generate releases subject to regulation) is sensitive to the toxicity of releases. Our analysis indicates that there is a relationship between consumer disutility from releases and the ultimate levels of toxic releases found in counties of the United States.
Additionally, we also demonstrate a relationship between release levels and the capitalintensity of manufacturing production. Admittedly, our capital-intensity measure is a rough proxy for the capital to labor ratio in a county, but the highly significant, positive coefficient on this variable suggests that the inclusion of such a measure is important in both national and international analyses. For now, we leave the construction of a better proxy for future research.
Finally, although we believe our theoretical results can be applied widely, we must be careful in extrapolating our empirical results to other geographic areas and other chemical types. Because of our reduced-form estimation, our empirical results are implicitly influenced by existing pollution regulations, legal structures, and other social, political, and environmental factors that we do not model directly. As a result, our empirical results can only be said to hold for U.S. data on toxic releases as reported in the TRI. Further work to include abatement and monitoring costs across pollutants, industries, and individual firms as well as data on pollution taxes would improve our understanding of the relationships studied herein. To extend this study to an international level would further necessitate the explicit consideration of regime types and constraints, levels of development, degrees of democratization, and openness of trade.
Nevertheless, we are able to provide further evidence for the quadratic relationship between income and environmental quality; we do so even within a single country where regime type, the representativeness of government, and environmental regulation is much more constrained across observations than in similar international studies. Furthermore, we find this quadratic relationship even when controlling for a wider variety of socioeconomic and chemical characteristics than previous studies. Other studies attempt to show that there exists a``turning point'' in income beyond which an economy will become cleaner, but we find evidence that suggests this turning point happens at lower levels of per capita income for more toxic chemicals (see Table 4 ). This last finding is consistent with standard microeconomic theory that suggests that society should first target pollutants for which a reduction will lead to the largest net marginal benefits. Finally, to the degree that these results are transferable to the findings of international studies like those of Antweiler et al. (2001) , our findings suggest that the beneficial impact of increased trade on the level of pollutants like sulfur dioxide might be even more dramatic for more toxic pollutants.
